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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Ford v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court of the United States interpreted the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment to include, “inflicting the pen-
alty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”1 Yet, Scott Louis Panetti, a man with a volu-
minous history of psychiatric disorders, is currently waiting to pay the ultimate penalty.2 
In 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Scott Panetti’s Eighth Amendment 
challenge to his death sentence.3 In that case—Panetti v. Quarterman—the Supreme 
Court, building upon the procedural requirements mandated in Ford, articulated the stand-
ard for determining whether the State may take the life of a mentally ill prisoner: a prisoner 
must have knowledge of his imminent death and rationally understand the retributive 
nexus between the crime and punishment before execution.4 
On remand to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the 
court determined that Scott Panetti was competent for execution because he could articu-
late a relatively sophisticated understanding of the facts of his case and could rationally 
articulate that his punishment was unjust.5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed.6 However, the district court and the Fifth Circuit’s application of Pan-
etti’s rational understanding standard violated the Eighth Amendment because it provided 
no more protection to the mentally ill sentenced to death than that required by Ford, and 
thus failing to satisfy the more exacting standards of Panetti. 
This note argues that the district court and Fifth Circuit’s application of the rational 
understanding standard was reprehensively deficient based on the courts’ holdings that 
Scott Panetti, a man with a well-documented mental illness accompanied by gross delu-
sions, was competent for execution in light of Ford.7 Part II examines the Court’s decision 
in Ford v. Wainwright establishing a categorical exemption to protect the insane from ex-
ecution, followed by an examination of the factual and procedural history of Panetti v. 
Quarterman.8 Part III analyzes the district court and the Fifth Circuit’s application of the 
rational understanding standard on remand, ultimately positing that the applications were 
flawed because there was insufficient evidence to conclude that Scott Panetti possessed 
                                                          
 1. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).  
 2. Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2013). Moreover, since Ford, the 5th Circuit has not found a 
single inmate incompetent for execution in Texas. See Scott Panetti, OFF CENTER MEDIA, http://www.off-cen-
ter.com/projects/scott-panetti (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). For an understanding of the difference between insan-
ity and mental illness, see Joseph Hess, The Death Penalty for Mentally Ill Offenders: Atkins, Roper, and Miti-
gation Factors Militate Against Categorical Exemption, 90 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 93 (2012). 
 3. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007). The Court additionally reached the issue of whether the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 foreclosed Panetti’s second habeas petition, though this 
note does not address the procedural issues in Panetti. For a discussion of whether Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence will depend on substantive or procedural claims see Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v. Quarterman: Is There A 
"Rational Understanding" of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
285, 297-300 (2007). 
 4. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958.  
 5. Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *36 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008). 
 6. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 410.  
 7. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (“The Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from 
inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”); Panetti, 727 F.3d at 414; Panetti, 2008 WL 
2338498, at *37. 
 8. Ford, 477 U.S. 399; Panetti, 551 U.S. 930. 
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the requisite rational understanding of the nexus between his crime and his imminent ex-
ecution.9 Part IV concludes by highlighting the courts’ failure to appreciate the effects of 
severe mental illness on death row inmates, explains the importance of psychological sci-
ence in competency hearings, advocates that placing a double evidentiary burden on the 
prisoner minimizes the protective effect of the Panetti standard, and discusses the conse-
quence of indigence on the seriously mentally ill prisoner.10 
II. FRAMING A CATEGORICAL EXEMPTION FOR THE SEVERELY MENTALLY ILL 
A. Ford v. Wainwright 
Ford v. Wainwright was the first case to explicitly create a categorical exemption 
for prisoners sentenced to death.11 In Ford, the Supreme Court held that executing the in-
sane was repugnant to the Eighth Amendment.12 In 1974, the State of Florida convicted 
Alvin Bernard Ford of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death.13 Though presum-
ably competent at the time of the offense, trial, and sentencing, Ford gradually began 
showing signs of mental illness leading up to his scheduled execution.14 Particularly, he 
had an obsession with the Ku Klux Klan and was under the delusion that there was a con-
spiracy to force him to commit suicide.15 He believed that the prison held 135 of his friends 
and family hostage and that he had appointed nine new justices to the Florida Supreme 
Court; in addition, he referred to himself as “Pope John Paul, III.”16 
Eventually, psychiatrist Dr. Jamal Amin evaluated Ford and diagnosed him as a par-
anoid schizophrenic with suicidal attributes.17 After refusing further meetings with Dr. 
Amin because of his belief that Dr. Amin joined the conspiracy against him, Ford met with 
Dr. Harold Kaufman.18 When Dr. Kaufman asked Ford if the State would execute him, 
Ford explained, “I can’t be executed because of the landmark case. I won. Ford v. State 
will prevent executions all over.”19 Dr. Kaufman posited that Ford did not understand the 
reasons for his execution and made no connection between his crime and the death pen-
alty.20 Instead, Ford believed that the State could not execute him because he owned the 
prison and controlled the governor using “mind waves.”21 
Subsequently, the Governor of Florida appointed three psychiatrists to evaluate Ford 
and determine whether he possessed the capacity to understand the nature of the death 
                                                          
 9. Panetti, 727 F.3d 398. 
 10. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 962 (2007).  
 11. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10; Jonathan Greenberg, For Every Action There Is A Reaction: The Procedural 
Pushback Against Panetti v. Quarterman, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 227, 255 (2012) (noting “Ford was the first 
Eighth Amendment case to establish a categorical exclusion shielding defendants from capital punishment, not 
because of conduct, but because of class-wide characteristics”). For further discussion of Ford, see Anthony J. 
Bishop, Ford v. Wainwright: Insanity of The Death Row Inmate—A Second Chance, 11 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
311 (1987). 
 12. Ford, 477 U.S. at 410. 
 13. Id. at 401.  
 14. Id. at 401-02. 
 15. Id. at 402.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Ford, 477 U.S. at 402-03. 
 18. Id. at 403. 
 19. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
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penalty and the State’s reasons for imposing it on him.22 One psychiatrist concluded that 
Ford was cognitively capable of understanding the nature of the death penalty as well as 
the State’s intent to execute him for committing murder.23 Reaching a similar conclusion, 
the second psychiatrist found Ford was psychotic, but fully understood the imminence of 
his execution.24 The third psychiatrist, who believed Ford’s mental illness seemed con-
trived, also determined that he completely understood his situation.25 Thereafter, without 
comment, the governor signed a death warrant authorizing Ford’s execution.26 
After the court denied his motion for a competency hearing, Ford filed a Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida requesting an evidentiary hearing to determine his competency to suffer execu-
tion.27 The district court denied Ford’s appeal and the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.28 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether 
executing the insane violated the Eighth Amendment.29  
1. Plurality Opinion in Ford v. Wainwright 
The plurality in Ford began its analysis by examining the common law bar against 
executing the insane and the various rationales for the rule.30 At early English common 
law, Sir Edward Coke explained that executing the insane was extremely inhumane and 
cruel and served no consequentialist purpose.31 Similarly, William Blackstone com-
mented: 
[I]diots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed 
when under these incapacities: no, not even for treason itself. Also, if a 
man in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and before arraign-
ment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it: because 
he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. 
And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be 
tried: for how can he make his defence? [sic] If, after he be tried and 
found guilty, he loses his senses before judgment, judgment shall not be 
pronounced; and if, after judgment, he becomes of nonsane memory, 
execution shall be stayed: for peradventure, says the humanity of the 
English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have 
alleged something in stay of judgment or execution.32 
                                                          
 22. Ford, 477 U.S. at 403; see Peggy M. Tobolowsky, To Panetti and Beyond-Defining and Identifying Cap-
ital Offenders Who Are Too "Insane" to Be Executed, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 369, 385 (2007) (indicating that each 
of the psychiatrists appointed by the governor, spent only thirty minutes interviewing Ford). 
 23. Ford, 477 U.S. at 404. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. 
 28. Ford, 477 U.S. at 404-05. 
 29. Id. at 404. As a secondary issue, the Court considered whether “the District Court should have held a 
hearing on petitioner’s claim.” Id. 
 30. Id. at 406. 
 31. Id. at 407 (stating “by intendment of Law the execution of the offender is for example, . . . but so it is not 
when a mad man is executed, but should be a miserable spectacle, both against Law and of extream inhumanity 
and cruelty, and can be no example to others”) (quoting 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 6 (6th ed. 1680)).  
 32. Id. at 406-07 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES D4 – 25). 
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The plurality then discussed “The Common Law 5,”— the five most common ra-
tionales for the prohibition of executing the insane: (1) executing the insane was repugnant 
to humanity; (2) executing the insane provided no example to others, thus it served no 
deterrent purpose; (3) religious underpinnings condemned executing the insane; (4) exe-
cuting the insane was superfluous because insanity was its own punishment; and (5) retri-
bution was not served because an insane person’s life has less value than that of a sane 
person.33 
Concluding that the common law bar against executing the insane and the accompa-
nying rationales remained valid in 1986, the plurality held that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibited the State from executing the insane.34 According to the plurality, “Whether its 
aim be to protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or 
to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance, 
the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth Amendment.”35 For the plurality, the chal-
lenging issue of whether a prisoner is too insane to comprehend the nature of the ultimate 
penalty requires trustworthy fact-finding and evidence conducive to establishing a neutral, 
sound, and professional determination.36 Essentially, the plurality recognized that in a civ-
ilized society it is imperative to employ fair principles to resolve whether a prisoner is 
competent to face the penalty of death by execution.37 
2. Justice Powell’s Concurrence in Ford v. Wainwright 
Though the plurality’s broad holding in Ford was that the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibited executing the insane, Justice Powell’s narrow concurrence is the controlling opin-
ion because no opinion obtained the required number of Justices to reach a majority.38 
Justice Powell began his concurrence by stating that the common law prohibited executing 
the insane because it constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and he concluded that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibited it for that same reason.39 Justice Powell’s concurrence, in 
part, attempted to define “the mental awareness” a prisoner must possess upon execution 
to satisfy the Eighth Amendment.40 
Justice Powell essentially rejected Blackstone’s common law rationale that execut-
ing an insane prisoner is wrong because the prisoner, if competent, may have provided 
exculpatory information prior to execution.41 According to Justice Powell, contemporary 
                                                          
 33. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407-08; see also J. Amy Dillard, Madness Alone Punishes the Madman: The Search 
for Moral Dignity in the Court's Competency Doctrine As Applied in Capital Cases, 79 TENN. L. REV. 461 (2012) 
(providing a more in-depth discussion of common law rationales for the bar against executing the insane). 
 34. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10. 
 35. Id. at 410. 
 36. Id. at 414 (“psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness [and] on the 
appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms”) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 
81 (1985)); id. at 417-18 (indicating that “in light of the clear need for trustworthiness in any fact finding . . . .”). 
 37. Id. at 417.  
 38. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977)); id. at 409-10. 
 39. Id. at 418 (Powell, J., concurring).  
 40. Id. at 419 (Powell, J., concurring) (also considering the procedures required by states to avoid de novo 
review in deferral court under 28 U.S.C. § 225(d)). 
 41. Id. at 419 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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jurisprudence provided greater review of convictions and afforded certain due process pro-
tections that were largely unavailable at common law.42 These mechanisms left Black-
stone’s rationale with little merit.43 Justice Powell accepted Coke’s proposition that the 
purpose of the death penalty is to deter future crime—a consequentialist goal—which does 
not justify executing the insane because doing so is repugnant to human decency.44 Justice 
Powell concluded that Coke’s consequentialist rationale retained vitality, adding that exe-
cuting the insane cannot satisfy retributivist goals because retribution depends upon the 
prisoner’s awareness of the penalty and the purpose for it.45 He also recognized that society 
commonly valued the ability to prepare mentally and spiritually for death.46 Thus, because 
executing the insane offends common ideas of morality and does not fulfill one of the chief 
justifications of the death penalty, many states, even at the time of Ford, required a mini-
mum showing that a death row inmate understood his or her imminent execution and the 
reason for it.47 
In light of the various rationales regarding the prohibition against executing the in-
sane, Justice Powell agreed that as a prerequisite to an inmate’s execution, the inmate must 
“know the fact of [his or her] impending execution and the reason for it.”48 Perhaps the 
thrust of Justice Powell’s argument, or at least what is most relative to Scott Panetti, was 
that an inmate must know of the impending execution because an inmate can only prepare 
for death if he or she knows that death is approaching.49 In addition, an inmate must know 
the reason for the impending execution because there is no retribution if a prisoner cannot 
appreciate the retributive connection between crime and punishment.50 
B. The Scott Panetti Story 
From 1986 to 2014, the State of Texas has executed almost 500 prisoners, and the 
Fifth Circuit has not found a single Texas inmate incompetent for execution, including 
                                                          
 42. Ford, 477 U.S. at 419-21 (Powell, J., concurring) (“if after judgment he become of non sane memory, his 
execution shall be spared; for were he of sound memory he might allege somewhat in stay of judgment or exe-
cution”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 1 M. HALE. PLEAS OF THE CROWN 35 (1936)). Justice Powell also 
cites 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 388-89 (9th ed. 1783). 
 43. Ford, 477 U.S. at 419-21 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 44. Id. at 419. n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). See 3 E. COKE. INSTITUTES 6 (1794). (“[A] miserable spectacle . 
. . of extream inhumanity and cruelty . . . can be no example to others.”). Consequentialists recognize that the 
purpose of punishment is to create positive societal consequences, such as rehabilitating the offender, incapaci-
tating the offender, and deterring the offender and other members of society from engaging in criminal activity. 
Retributivists, though, believe that the offender’s conduct justifies punishment simply because he or she deserves 
it. See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 
843, 856-57, 859-860 (2002). 
 45. Ford, 477 U.S. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 421-22 (Powell, J., concurring) (“A person is unfit to be executed if because of a mental condition 
he is unable to understand the nature and purpose of such sentence.”) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985 & 
Supp. 1986)). 
 48. Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining that “[s]uch a standard appropriately defines the kind of 
mental deficiency that should trigger the Eighth Amendment prohibition”). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.; see also Greenberg, supra note 11, at 231 (explaining that Powell’s test sets the “constitutional floor,” 
allowing states to create heightened competency requirements). The Supreme Court ultimately remanded Alvin 
Ford’s competency determination and the district court held that he was sane. Ford died of natural causes while 
his appeal was pending. Alvin Ford, 37, Dies; Stricken on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1991, http://www.ny-
times.com/1991/03/09/obituaries/alvin-ford-37-dies-stricken-on-death-row.html. 
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Scott Panetti.51 Scott Panetti exhibited signs of mental illness well before he murdered his 
wife’s parents and well before he arrived on Texas’s death row.52 With the exception of a 
near-drowning accident at age five, which may have somewhat hindered his cognitive de-
velopment, Panetti exhibited all the characteristics of an ordinary child.53 However, as a 
teenager he drew further away from his family.54 On some days he acted completely nor-
mal, and on others he seemed like a completely different person.55 His first documented 
encounter with a mental health professional was at age eighteen.56 
In 1978, shortly after his first evaluation, Panetti sustained severe electrical burns 
and a psychiatrist diagnosed him with moderate to severe sociopathic personality disorder 
and early schizophrenia.57 His symptoms included a low frustration tolerance, flight of 
ideas, hallucinations of red flashing lights, and confusing his voice with others.58 Three 
years later he involuntarily entered a psychiatric hospital where he received treatment for 
substance abuse and aggressive, delusional, and paranoid behavior.59 Then, in 1986, Pan-
etti entered a drug treatment center where, upon admission, evaluators diagnosed him as 
psychotic.60 While at the treatment facility, Panetti chased his wife’s car, leaving with her 
only to return the following day.61 The next month, doctors diagnosed Panetti with chronic 
undifferentiated schizophrenia.62 Panetti transferred to another psychiatric hospital, where 
his wife described his episodes of paranoid behavior as including a belief that the devil 
occupied his belongings causing him to bury his furniture outside and to nail the curtains 
shut so that the neighbors would not film him.63 His wife also explained that Panetti pre-
sented a coherent front, or the appearance of normalcy, after his transfer, but soon disinte-
grated.64 
                                                          
 51. Executed Offenders, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Mar. 10, 2014), 
https://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_executions_by_year.html (providing a list of executions); Scott Pan-
etti, supra note 2; Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming the trial court’s determination that 
Scott Panetti is competent for execution). 
 52. See Brief for Petitioner at 6, Panetti, v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (No. 06-6407) (noting “Panetti 
suffered from a severe mental illness long before he ever arrived on Texas’s death row”). Mary Solbrig, an 
attorney, who was once Scott’s payee for SSI benefits, stated Scott mentally deteriorated in the last twenty years. 
Scott Panetti, supra note 2. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. His mother, Yvonne, opined that she first thought his bizarre behavior was merely a phase, which he 
would out grow. Yvonne commented that he was a terrific child, but exhibited bizarre behavior during his teen-
aged years. On one occasion, when he was sixteen, Yvonne remembered Scott acting like he heard music, and 
when she asked, he responded, “it is just the music in my hear.” Id.  
 55. Id. It was also around this age when Scott’s sister noticed that he was sick. She recalls Scott incessantly 
calling a radio station, requesting that they play his song, and referring to himself as “Sergeant Iron Horse.” Id.  
 56. Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008). 
 57. Id.; THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 153 (Am. Psychiatric Ass’n 
4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR] (defining schizophrenia as at least two of the following symptoms: de-
lusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior, and/or negative symp-
toms, such as affective flattering, alogia, or avolition). 
 58. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *4. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at *5. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 57, at 156 (explaining that undifferentiated means that an individual meets 
the criteria for schizophrenia, but do not meet the specific criteria for paranoid, disorganized or catatonic schiz-
ophrenia).  
 63. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *5. See also Panetti, supra note 2 (explaining that Scott believed that the 
devil was out to get him and he washed his belongings to exercise the devil).  
 64. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *5. 
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After Panetti’s release, he and his wife separated and he moved to Wisconsin where 
he entered yet another hospital for psychiatric treatment.65 Based on Panetti’s statements 
that he heard strange voices and music since adolescence and his dependence on controlled 
substances “to quiet the voices,” the psychiatrist diagnosed Panetti with chronic undiffer-
entiated schizophrenia and alcohol and drug dependence.66 That same month, he entered a 
hospital to treat his suicidal thoughts.67 The psychiatrist diagnosed Panetti with major de-
pression with psychotic features.68 
Panetti then moved back to Texas and returned to the drug treatment center.69 The 
evaluator at the treatment center “emphatically state[d], ‘[t]here is no doubt in my mind 
that he is delusional and that at this point he is unable to have any realistic orientation 
towards his own situation . . . I’m also sure that he is unable to function in any form or 
fashion at this point.’”70 Over the next three months, Panetti received treatment for 
schizoaffective disorder and alcohol and substance abuse.71 
For the next three years, Panetti remained relatively stable; he received outpatient 
treatment and married his second wife.72 However, in 1990, Panetti swung a cavalry sword 
at his wife, threatening to kill her, their child, his father-in-law, and himself by burning 
down the house.73 This resulted in another involuntary commitment to a psychiatric hos-
pital.74 Around this same time, he called himself “Sergeant Iron Horse.”75 In 1991, Panetti 
checked himself into a hospital, where evaluators noted that Panetti had some preoccupa-
tion with religion and poor impulse control.76 He continued outpatient treatment intermit-
tently for the next year, but eventually stopped taking his antipsychotic medications and 
going to his appointments.77 A notation in Panetti’s outpatient treatment file from Septem-
ber 1, 1992 indicated that Panetti failed to refill his prescribed medications.78 
Seven days after that notation, on September 8, 1992, Panetti shaved his head, 
donned military camouflage fatigues, and went to the home of his parents-in-law—Joe and 
Amanda Alvarado—with a sawed-off shotgun and a deer rifle.79 He shot Joe and Amanda 
                                                          
 65. Id. at *6. 
 66. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 57, at 168, 174-75 (explaining Major Depressive Disorder as having two or 
more Major Depressive Episodes, which include at least five of the following symptoms existing during the same 
two week period, representing a change in previous function, and at least one of the symptoms is either depressed 
mood or loss of interest or pleasure: depressed mood most of the day or nearly every day; diminished interest or 
pleasure; significant weight loss; recurrent insomnia or hypersomnia; psychomotor agitation or retardation; fa-
tigue or loss of energy almost daily; feelings of worthlessness or excessive guilt; diminished ability to think 
clearly; and/or recurrently thinking of death).  
 69. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *7. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at *8.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *8. 
 75. Id. See also Scott Panetti, supra note 2 (wherein Panetti’s sister recalls him referring to himself as “Sarge” 
as early as eighteen or nineteen). 
 76. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *8. 
 77. Id. at *9. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 7. For a more detailed account of the crime, see Panetti, 2008 WL 
2338498, at *9 (quoting State v. Panetti, 891 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App. 1994)); see also Scott Panetti, supra note 
2. 
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in front of his wife and daughter.80 Panetti forced his wife and daughter into the bunkhouse 
where he lived.81 After a standoff with police that lasted most of the night, Panetti eventu-
ally released his wife and daughter without physical harm.82 
The State of Texas indicted Panetti on September 18, 1992.83 Based on Panetti’s 
long history of mental illness, the trial judge ordered a psychiatric evaluation and ap-
pointed Preston Douglas as his defense counsel.84 Dr. E. Lee Simes evaluated Panetti and 
reported that Panetti did not know what year it was, nor could he identify the President.85 
Panetti’s thought process was loose and tangential, meaning disorganized, and he reported 
to Dr. Simes that he experienced auditory and visual hallucinations, including visions of 
Jesus Christ visiting his cell.86 The doctor also reported that Panetti experienced other 
chronic delusions, including a preoccupation with religion, and that he suffered from “ob-
vious mental difficulties.”87 Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence of Panetti’s 
mental incompetence, Dr. Simes concluded that Panetti was competent.88 The court held 
a competency hearing and the jury found Panetti competent to stand trial.89 Months later, 
Panetti refused to take his anti-psychotic medication, claiming that God cured his schizo-
phrenia and requested that the trial court allow him to represent himself.90 The trial court 
granted his request.91 
Panetti wore a purple cowboy outfit and applied for more than 200 subpoenas, re-
questing testimony from, among others, John F. Kennedy, the Pope, and Jesus Christ.92 
Panetti’s standby counsel said his “performance was ‘bizarre,’ ‘scary,’ and ‘trance-like,’ 
rendering his trial ‘a judicial farce and a mockery of self-representation.’”93 The jury found 
Panetti guilty of murder and sentenced him to death.94 After nearly a decade of appeals, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “whether the Eighth Amendment per-
mits the execution of a prisoner whose mental illness deprives him of the ‘mental capacity 
to understand that [he or she] is being executed as punishment for a crime.’”95 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S RATIONAL UNDERSTANDING STANDARD AND THE LOWER 
                                                          
 80. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 7. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *11. 
 84. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 7-8. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id.; cf. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *11-12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 88. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 8. For an analysis of Panetti’s proceedings at trial see Richard J. 
Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman: Mental Illness, the Death Penalty, and Human Dignity, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
257 (2007). 
 89. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 8. The judge ordered a mistrial in the first competency trial, because 
the jury deliberated for almost twelve hours. It was the second jury that found Scott competent. Id. 
 90. Id. at 10-11. Panetti referred to the curing as his “April Fool’s Day revelation[.]” Id.  
 91. Id. at 11. 
 92. Id. at 11-16. Panetti recanted Jesus Christ’s subpoena, stating “Jesus Christ, he doesn't need a subpoena. 
He's right here with me, and we'll get into that.” Id.  
 93. Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 936 
(2007)). 
 94. See State v. Panetti, 891 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App. 1994). 
 95. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 954. 
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COURTS’ HOLLOW APPLICATION 
A. Panetti v. Quarterman 
In Panetti v. Quarterman, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner must have 
knowledge of his or her imminent death and rationally understand the retributive nexus 
between the crime and the punishment before execution, finding that the court of appeals’ 
determination of Panetti’s competence rested on a flawed interpretation of Ford.96 Though 
the Court ultimately remanded Panetti’s competency determination, its discussion regard-
ing the integrity of Panetti’s fixed delusions demonstrated the Court’s acceptance that Pan-
etti had a true psychotic disorder that may have prevented him from rationally understand-
ing that the State intended to take his life as a consequence of the murder of his in-laws.97 
The Court reasoned that whether Panetti’s delusions prevented him from comprehending 
the retributive connection between his impending death and the murder of his in-laws was 
a question for the lower court to resolve with the aid of psychiatric science.98 
The competency for execution standard applied by the court of appeals was whether 
the prisoner was aware of his execution and the reason for it.99 The Court held that this 
standard was too restrictive to comply with the Eighth Amendment because it disregarded 
a prisoner’s delusional belief system so long as the prisoner in fact knew that the State 
“identified his [or her] crimes as the reason for his execution.”100 The Ford majority sug-
gested that delusions are relevant to comprehension and awareness if they impair the pris-
oner’s ability to grasp a rational understanding of the reasons for the execution.101 In es-
sence, the court of appeals erred in finding that Panetti was competent for execution based 
solely on his ability to articulate that the State would execute him and the State’s reasons 
for the execution, without determining whether Panetti’s delusional belief system pre-
vented him from truly appreciating that his impending death was a consequence of his 
capital crimes.102 The Court reasoned that the competency for execution standard applied 
by the court of appeals failed to align with Ford because Ford emphasized that retributiv-
ism requires that the offender recognize the gravity of his or her offense.103 
As recognized by the Court, the record contained a significant amount of evidence 
supporting that Panetti suffered from severe delusions.104 Such evidence indicated that 
Panetti’s fixed delusional belief system prevented him from truly grasping that his execu-
tion was a consequence of his crimes.105 One of Panetti’s experts stated that his mental 
health issues were symptomatic of schizoaffective disorder, which caused him to have a 
“genuine delusion” regarding his understanding of the reasons for his execution.106 The 
                                                          
 96. Id. at 958. 
 97. Id. at 955.  
 98. Id. at 962. 
 99. Id. at 956 (citing Panetti v. Dretke, 448 F.3d 815, 819 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Barnard v. Collins, 13 F.3d 
871, 877 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
 100. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 956, 958. 
 101. Id. at 958. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 959. 
 104. Id. at 956. 
 105. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 954-56. 
 106. Id.; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 57, at 159 (describing schizoaffective disorder as “an uninterrupted period 
of illness during which, as time there is either a Major Depressive Episode, a Manic Episode, or a Mixed Episode 
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expert explained that Panetti believed he was “[engaged in] spiritual warfare . . . between 
the demons and the forces of the darkness and God and the angels and the forces of 
light.”107 Although Panetti could articulate on a superficial level that the State sought to 
execute him for his crimes, the expert determined that Panetti truly believed the State’s 
reason was a sham to conceal the State’s true purpose—to stop him from preaching the 
gospel.108 Three other expert witnesses reached similar conclusions regarding the genuine-
ness and severity of Panetti’s delusions.109 
The State’s expert witnesses opined that Panetti’s purported beliefs did not indicate 
incompetence because Panetti could periodically think clearly and lucidly.110 However, 
the Court dismissed the State’s witnesses’ explanation that Panetti was competent because 
the Court accepted Panetti’s rebuttal witness, who provided that schizophrenia does not 
necessarily diminish a person’s cognitive ability.111 The rebuttal witness stated that a per-
son with schizophrenia can demonstrate rational thought in connection with reality one 
moment, but when stimulated, his or her lucid thought becomes tangential.112 The Court 
additionally stated that an un-medicated schizophrenic can sporadically hold an orderly 
conversation but the ability to do so is dependent upon whether the discussion pertains to 
the person’s fixed delusional belief system.113 
Though the Court remanded Panetti’s competency determination, it seemed con-
vinced that Panetti’s delusions were genuine and that such delusions might “put [his] 
awareness of [the] link between [his] crime and its punishment in a context so far removed 
from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose.”114 It was not enough that 
Panetti was aware of the State’s identified link between his crimes and the punishment.115 
He must have a rational understanding of the State’s reason for his execution.116 Thus the 
court’s task on remand was to determine whether Panetti’s delusional beliefs prevented 
him from comprehending that his execution was a consequence of his crimes—not a con-
sequence of demonic spiritual warfare.117 The Court was clear that psychiatric science—
including the conclusions of physicians, psychiatrists, and other experts in the field—
should determine the extent to which Panetti’s delusions prevented him from appreciating 
the retributive connection between his crimes and his punishment.118 
B.  Evidence Presented at Panetti’s Subsequent Habeas Corpus Proceeding 
The evidence presented in Panetti II failed to meet the Panetti standard because it 
did not demonstrate that Panetti rationally understood the nexus between the murder of his 
                                                          
concurrent with symptoms that meet [the criteria for] Schizophrenia;” during the time of the illness there are 
delusions are hallucinations for at least two weeks; the symptoms that meet the criteria for a mood episode exist 
for a substantial portion of the illness; and the disturbance is not a result of a substance or medical condition).  
 107. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 954-56 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 955. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 955. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 960. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 960.  
 118. Id. at 962. 
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in-laws and his execution.119 
1. Psychiatric Evaluations 
The district court included testimony from three of Panetti’s experts in its opinion.120 
First, Dr. Leslie Rosenstein evaluated Panetti in 2007 and administered more than sixteen 
tests.121 She remarked that during cognitive testing, Panetti “put[] forth good effort” and 
he demonstrated disappointment and frustration when he did not perform perfectly.122 In 
addition, his speech was clear and normal in rate, rhythm, and tone.123 However, Panetti 
demonstrated difficulty focusing his attention, often becoming tangential.124 She con-
cluded that the likelihood of Panetti’s malingering was low and that his behavior was in-
dicative of frontal-executive deficits, which are symptomatic of chronic psychotic disor-
ders like schizoaffective disorder and schizophrenia.125 
Two more of Panetti’s experts provided opinions as to whether he had a rational 
understanding of the retributive connection between his crimes and punishment.126 Dr. 
Mary Alice Conroy interviewed Panetti in December, 2007.127 She stated that Panetti’s 
speech was less pressured than when she evaluated him in 2004.128 Consistent with Dr. 
Rosenstein’s evaluation, Dr. Conroy described that Panetti intermittently provided logical 
and organized responses to her questions, but would subsequently devolve, “becom[ing] 
increasingly tangential unless redirected.”129 She reported that while interviewing Panetti, 
he talked of conspiracies involving corporations and the Bush family in league with the 
devil.130 When Dr. Conroy asked Panetti about his execution, Panetti explained that God 
revealed to him that he would become a very old preacher.131 He also described two in-
stances when angels visited him, disguised as correctional officers.132 
                                                          
 119. Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *36 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008). 
 120. Id. at *19-22. 
 121. Report or Affidavit of Leslie D. Rosenstein, Panetti v. Quarterman, No. 04CV00042, 2007 WL 7119864 
(W.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2007): 
Dr. Rosenstein is a clinical neuropsychologist, board certified by the American Board of 
Professional Psychology. She practices in the Neuropsychology Clinic, P.C. in Austin and 
provides consultation to the Mary Lee Foundation Rehabilitation Center. She is a member 
of the American and Texas Psychological Associations, the International and Austin Neu-
ropsychological Societies, and is a board member of the American Academy of Clinical 
Neuropsychology and the American Academy of Clinical Neuropsychology Foundation. 
Dr. Rosenstein has also served as a consultant for the Jurisprudence and Oral Examinations 
administered by the Texas State Board of Examiners of Psychologists. She received a 
bachelors degree and a doctorate of Psychology from the University of Texas and com-
pleted a doctoral specialization in Clinical Psychology with a major in Neuropsychology 
at the University of Arizona. Leslie D. Rosenstein, Ph.D., Texas State Directory.  
https://www.txdirectory.com/online/person/?id=37992&office=20103.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *19-20. 
 126. Id. at *20-22. 
 127. Forensic Evaluation Competence for Execution of Mary Alice Conroy, Ph.D., Panetti v. Quarterman, No. 
04CV00042, 2008 WL 7650343 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2008). She also interviewed him twice in August of 2004. 
Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *21-22. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Forensic Evaluation Competence for Execution of Mary Alice Conroy, Ph.D., supra note 127. 
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In addition, Dr. Conroy administered the Structured Interview of Reported System 
(“SIRS”) to measure forms of dissimulation, such as malingering.133 Panetti’s results re-
vealed honesty in seven of the eight primary scales of the SIRS, thus yielding a ninety-
five percent probability that he was not malingering.134 In Dr. Conroy’s opinion, Panetti’s 
symptoms demonstrated “a very real schizophrenic condition.”135 She ultimately diag-
nosed Panetti with Schizoaffective Disorder, denoting that Panetti’s level of confusion and 
mood varied, but his underlying thought disorder remained consistent.136 According to Dr. 
Conroy, Panetti did not rationally understand that the State sought to execute him as retri-
bution for his crimes.137 Instead, he genuinely believed that evil forces sought his death to 
silence him from preaching God’s word, and that he was invulnerable to execution because 
God wanted him to become a very old preacher.138 Dr. David Self, Panetti’s third expert, 
reached the same conclusions regarding Panetti’s mental health and competency, adding 
that Panetti was also incompetent to stand trial.139 
The district court’s opinion also contained testimony from six State experts, includ-
ing three deposed psychotherapists the prison hired to conduct routine assessments of 
death row inmates.140 Dr. Tom Allen did not provide an opinion with regard to Panetti’s 
competence for execution but did provide an assessment of Panetti’s psychological func-
tioning.141 He concluded that the probability of Panetti’s malingering was high because his 
                                                          
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. Dr. Conroy concluded that Panetti was schizophrenic for the following reasons:  
Mr. Panetti evidenced this disorder over time for a number of years prior to the murder of 
his in-laws. His delusions have a consistent theme and his symptoms are described by 
observers with relative consistency. Mr. Panetti has responded favorably in the past to 
treatment with antipsychotic agents. The symptoms go well beyond those that could be 
attributed simply to substance abuse and have persisted in the absence of substances. The 
type of thought disorder displayed by Mr. Panetti during lengthy interviews (i.e., flight of 
ideas, loose associations, tangential thinking) is nearly impossible to fake. Mr. Panetti does 
not claim obvious symptoms of mental illness, claims one often sees in those who malin-
ger. For example, when asked directly and given every opportunity to endorse hallucina-
tions, he demurs. He is currently adamant that he is not mentally ill, saying that he proba-
bly was at one time (even admitting to symptoms in the distant past) but insisting that he 
was a “born again April Fool,” when God healed him on April 1, 1995. His behavior dur-
ing this evaluation was totally consistent with reports of his behavior in TDCJ over recent 
years. Almost everyone interviewed on the record noted that he does not socialize with 
others, but preaches to them constantly - even in the face of rejection and hostility. This is 
totally consistent with his delusional belief that he is on Death Row on God's mission and 
that the forces of evil are trying to execute him to silence his preaching. Neuropsycholog-
ical assessment results are consistent with a psychotic process. On the only test of func-
tional malingering administered, the SIRS, Mr. Panetti's scores indicate a 95% probability 
that he is responding honestly. 
Id. 
 136. Id. Dr. Conroy explained that:  
Schizoaffective Disorder is a severe and chronic psychotic disturbance. It is often charac-
terized by significant thought disorder (i.e., flight of ideas, loose associations, disorgani-
zation, tangential speech), hallucinations, and delusional thinking. Mood and affect may 
change with some frequency; however, some of the underlying psychotic ideas are con-
sistent over time. 
Id.  
 137. Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *22 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008). 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at *21. 
 140. Id. at *23-27. 
 141. Id. at *23-24. 
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scores on the Green’s Word Memory Test were similar to experimental groups of patients 
asked to fake schizophrenia and because Panetti’s past schizophrenic-like behaviors were 
symptomatic of substance abuse.142 
Dr. Alan Waldman was skeptical that Panetti had any psychotic disorder whatsoever, 
and thus concluded that he had a rational understanding.143 In the course of Dr. Waldman’s 
interview, he asked Panetti direct questions about the reason for his execution.144 For ex-
ample, when Dr. Waldman asked Panetti why he was on death row, Panetti responded, 
“[t]hey’re trying to rub me out, it’s unjust.”145 When Dr. Waldman asked Panetti why it 
was unjust Panetti explained, “it is a conspiracy.”146 Dr. Waldman next asked Panetti why 
the conspiracy targeted him, and Panetti provided a “nonsensical personalized religious 
answer.”147 Dr. Waldman stated that when Panetti wanted to answer a question he was 
organized and coherent, but when he did not want to answer a question he replied with 
nonsensical religious statements.148 Contrary to his statement that Panetti answered non-
sensically, Dr. Waldman also explained that Panetti recited “biblical response[s], but [they 
were] always organized and understandable.”149 Dr. Waldman essentially asserted that 
each of Panetti’s diagnoses of psychotic disorders were incorrect and that Panetti’s “so-
called ‘delusion’ [was] wholly self-serving and [had] but one purpose that [was] to spare 
him from the sentence handed down by the jury of his peers.”150 
Additionally, Dr. Priscilla Ray provided an expert opinion regarding the extent to 
which mental health experts are able to aid the court in determining competency for exe-
cution eligibility.151 She explained that while psychiatric science can aid the courts, there 
are limitations because no objective test can determine what someone knows; therefore, 
an assessment of a mentally ill prisoner’s capacity to understand is more feasible than his 
or her actual understanding.152 
In addition, the State deposed three psychotherapists who routinely evaluated death 
row inmates.153 None could independently recollect Panetti and the reports of their routine 
assessments were unremarkable.154 Further, none of the deposed witnesses provided an 
opinion as to whether Panetti’s delusions prevented him from having a rational under-
standing of the nexus between his crimes and punishment.155 
In essence, only one of the State’s experts actually determined whether Panetti had 
a rational understanding of the reasons for his execution.156 That expert concluded that 
                                                          
 142. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, *23-24. 
 143. Id. at *24-26. 
 144. The Evaluation of Scott Louis Panetti of Alan J. Waldman, M.D., Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-
042-SS, 2007 WL 7085068 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008). 
 145. Id. at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 146. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at *3. 
 149. The Evaluation of Scott Louis Panetti of Alan J. Waldman, M.D., supra note 144, at *9.  
 150. Id. at *11. However, Panetti’s delusions existed before any motive existed, years before he murdered his 
wife’s parents. Id. 
 151. Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *26 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008). 
 152. Id. The state lost on this issue in Panetti. Id.  
 153. Id. at *28. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *24-26. 
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Panetti rationally understood his punishment because he doubted that Panetti suffered from 
any psychotic disorder whatsoever, a finding that was unsupported by decades of diagno-
ses, Dr. Rosenstein’s testimony, and the Supreme Court’s own statement that Scott Panetti 
suffered from a psychotic disorder.157 Alternatively, two of Panetti’s experts testified that 
Panetti’s gross delusions, caused by his severe mental illness, prevented him from ration-
ally understanding that his execution was a consequence of his crimes.158 
2. Testimony of Inmates, Guards, and Staff 
The district court opinion included testimony from Panetti’s fellow inmates, guards, 
and staff who attested to Panetti’s unwavering erratic behavior.159 One inmate deemed 
Panetti’s demeanor bizarre stating, “one minute everything[] [was] good, the next minute 
he[] [was] ranting and raving fire and brimstone again, like flipping a switch.”160 As pre-
viously explained by the Supreme Court in Panetti v. Quarterman, this behavior is entirely 
consistent with schizophrenia because a person with schizophrenia can demonstrate ra-
tional thought in one moment and tangential thought the next.161 In addition, the inmate 
testified that Panetti screamed Bible passages at the top of his lungs, often up to seven 
hours a day, and when other inmates yelled, threw water, and shot sharp objects at him, he 
appeared unfazed.162 The other inmate gave similar testimony, adding that Panetti insisted 
that the inmate call him “Ranahan.”163 Additionally, five death row guards and staff mem-
bers also attested to Panetti’s compulsive preoccupation with religion.164 
3. Recorded Conversations Between Panetti and His Family 
The State also presented eleven hours of audio recordings of visits between Panetti 
and his family.165 The district court explained that Panetti’s pace of speech remained nor-
mal even when he spoke of corrupt Texas politics, never becoming irrational, tangential, 
or pressured.166 In addition, when he spoke of corrupt politics and the trial court’s 
“screwups” and made the statement, “Fredericksburg had to have a hanging[,]” he did not 
mention spiritual corruption.167 The court described his comments as remarkably self-cen-
tered.168  He often quoted scripture and spoke religiously but did not rant.169 In initiating a 
conversation about the death penalty, Panetti expressed his moral opposition to it while 
                                                          
 157. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 960 (2007); Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *5-8, *20, *25, *28. 
 158. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *21-22. 
 159. Id. at *26-28. 
 160. Id. at *26 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 161. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 555. 
 162. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *26. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at *27-28. Sadly, one staff additionally testified that the guards placed trouble inmates in Panetti’s cell 
as punishment. The courts did not address Dr. Waldman’s interview with Phyllis Morrow, the prison’s mailroom 
supervisor, whose opinion was that Panetti was not schizophrenic, because Panetti did not act like her nephew 
who had schizophrenia. Her testimony is entirely unscientific and based upon her subjective conception of schiz-
ophrenia. Id. 
 165. Id. at *28-30. 
 166. Id. at *28. 
 167. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *28 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
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maintaining organized speech.170 With regard to Panetti’s statements about his habeas case, 
the court explained that Panetti “demonstrate[d] a fairly sophisticated understanding of his 
circumstances.”171 As an example, the court pointed out that Panetti instructed his parents 
to tell a member of his defense team about a character witness and seemed paranoid about 
the conversation being recorded, assuring any listeners that he was not in cahoots with the 
character witness.172 
4. Culmination of the District Court’s Evidence 
In sum, the district court’s opinion included more evidence of Panetti’s incompe-
tency than of his competency.173 Three experts for Panetti concluded that he was not ma-
lingering and did not rationally understand that his execution resulted from murdering his 
in-laws.174 Three inmates and five guards testified that Panetti’s insane behavior was con-
stant and existed outside the purview of evaluators.175 The court’s opinion provided no 
testimony evidence asserting that Panetti stated that he knew his execution was a conse-
quence of his in-law’s murder.176 The district court rested its determination of Panetti’s 
competency on only two factual bases: the testimony of a State’s witness, Dr. Waldman, 
and the recorded conversations between Panetti and his family.177 
C.  The District Court’s Misapplication of the Rational Understanding Standard 
Though the district court articulated the appropriate standard, its application was 
reprehensively deficient based on the extreme dissonance between the evidence presented 
and the court’s conclusion that Panetti had a rational understanding of the nexus between 
murdering his in-laws and his execution.178 The court found Panetti competent for three 
primary reasons, all of which were fundamentally flawed due to the court’s unscientific 
conception of mental illness.179 First, Panetti had a sophisticated understanding of his 
case.180 Second, Panetti understood the adversarial process.181 Third, Panetti believed that 
the State and trial court were corrupt, and that it was wrong to execute him because he was 
mentally ill at the time he committed his crimes.182 
1. Panetti’s “Sophisticated Understanding” of His Case 
The court’s first premise was that Panetti necessarily rationally understood his pun-
ishment because he had “a fairly sophisticated understanding of his case.”183 The court 
supported this conclusion with Panetti’s reference to a character witness who could testify 
                                                          
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at *28-29. 
 172. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *29. 
 173. Id. at *20-29. 
 174. Id. at *19-22. 
 175. Id. at *26-28. 
 176. Id. at *20-29.  
 177. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *24-26, *36. 
 178. Id. at *20-29. 
 179. Id. at *24-26, *28-29, *36. 
 180. Id. at *28-29. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *36. 
 183. Id. at *28-29. 
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 50 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol50/iss1/8
2014] “RATIONALLY UNDERSTANDING” 259 
to his preaching and Panetti’s statement that his parents should not worry about the out-
come of his competency hearing because he could appeal it to the Supreme Court.184 How-
ever, in making this determination, the district court did not comply with the Supreme 
Court’s instruction in Panetti to meaningfully consider expert testimony and develop a 
record supporting the competency determination.185 Instead, the district court excluded 
much of the expert testimony from its analysis, including two of Panetti’s psychiatric eval-
uators who concluded that Panetti was not competent for execution, and instead substituted 
its own conclusions.186 By ignoring the Supreme Court’s instructions, the district court 
deemed Panetti’s delusions irrelevant because it concluded he was cognitively aware of 
his circumstances.187 
Psychiatric science establishes that it is unwarranted for a court to infer that a pris-
oner rationally understands the reason for his or her execution merely because he can re-
gurgitate facts he heard.188 A schizophrenic can articulate a semantic connection, or iden-
tify the State’s purported reason for his execution while believing that reason is a sham.189 
The court’s conclusion that Panetti’s sophisticated understanding of his case necessarily 
meant that he rationally understood the retributive value of his execution is the type of 
danger noted by the National Alliance on Mental Illness (“NAMI”), which remarks that 
courts “assessing competency repeatedly engage in factual reasoning that is wholly unsup-
ported by the scientific understanding of psychotic disorders.”190 
2. Panetti’s Understanding of the Adversarial Process 
The district court based its second premise on Panetti’s understanding of the adver-
sarial process reflected in his rational understanding of the case, as evidenced by his will-
ingness to cooperate with Dr. Rosenstein and unwillingness to cooperate with the State’s 
experts.191 The defense argued that his refusal to cooperate with the State’s experts was 
because of his fixed delusion that the experts were part of a demonic conspiracy.192 The 
court dismissed this explanation, stating that Panetti’s recognition of the State’s witness 
as a member of “other side” meant that he rationally understood the adversarial process.193 
In actuality, Panetti’s understanding of the adversarial nature of his case was, once again, 
nothing more than a reflection of his cognitive ability to factually understand his case.194 
A prisoner can have awareness of various aspects of the world around him or her, including 
the adversarial nature of habeas proceedings, yet harbor delusional beliefs.195 Regardless, 
                                                          
 184. Id. at *28-29. 
 185. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 962 (2007); Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *28-29. 
 186. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 962; Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *28-29. 
 187. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 962; Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *28-29. 
 188. Bonnie, supra note 88, at 257. Essentially, a semantic connection is a prisoner’s generalized identification 
of the State’s purported reason for execution, or the superficial realization that “people who are convicted of 
crimes are sent to prison or executed.” Further, psychotic decompensation allows the prisoner to possess a se-
mantic connection, while it distorts his ability to appreciate the significance of his punishment. Id. 
 189. Brief for Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness as Amicus Curiae at 5, Ferguson v. Crews, 134 S. Ct. 33 (2013) 
(No. 13-5507) [hereinafter NAMI]. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *36. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 194. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 955 (2007). 
 195. NAMI, supra note 189, at 13. 
17
Arnold: The Challenge of "Rationally Understanding" A Schzophrenic's Delu
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014
260 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:243 
the court failed to explain how Panetti’s understanding of the adversarial process meant 
that he had a rational understanding of his punishment, nor did it provide a reason or any 
scientific explanation for dismissing the defense’s argument that Panetti was speaking of 
forces of darkness when he referenced the “other side.”196 
3. Panetti’s Belief in the Unjustness of His Sentence 
The district court’s final premise was that Panetti had a rational understanding of his 
punishment because he spoke of corrupt Texas politics in a non-delusional manner, and 
that he believed it was wrong for the State to execute him because he was insane at the 
time he committed the murders.197 Again, the court erred by substituting its own unscien-
tific and subjective opinion for the judgment of qualified psychiatrists.198 With regard to 
the recordings, the court extracted a few isolated statements from hours of audio, minimiz-
ing the extent of Panetti’s delusions and mental illness.199 In doing so, it ignored statements 
that demonstrated Panetti’s incompetence and rested its findings on a misconceived idea 
of mental illness.200 For instance, the court explained that Panetti’s statement that the trial 
judge was corrupt indicated Panetti’s ability to discuss his case in a non-delusional man-
ner; however, the court did not mention that Panetti also referred to the trial judge as a 
“devil worshipper.”201 As yet another example, the court noted that Panetti’s recognition 
that Dr. Waldman treated mental illness necessarily meant that Panetti understood that his 
execution resulted from him killing his in-laws.202 However, the court does not explain 
how Panetti’s cognizance of mental illness, or Dr. Waldman’s occupation, necessitated a 
finding that he understood the retributive nature of his punishment.203 
Moreover, in viewing Panetti’s statements in isolation, the court did not consider 
that Panetti’s statement regarding the unjustness of his execution demonstrated the severity 
of his mental illness.204 Panetti believed he retrospectively recognized he was insane at the 
time he committed the murders because God cured him of mental illness on April 1, 1995, 
which he called his “April Fool’s Day Revelation.”205 After that day he refused to take 
antipsychotic medication, believing he was no longer insane.206 He further believed that 
                                                          
 196. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *36. 
 197. Id. at *28, *26. 
 198. Id.  
 199. Id.; Oral Argument at 19:44, Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 08-705515), available 
at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/08/08-70015_6-4-2013.wma. 
 200. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *26, *28; NAMI, supra note 189, at 13. 
 201. Oral Argument, supra note 199, at 51:06. 
 202. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *25, *36. 
 203. Id. In doing so, the court suggests that an individual is not mentally ill if he or she is aware of mental 
illness. Again, that is not the Panetti test. Id.  
 204. Id. 
 205. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 52, at 10-11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 206. Id. Another salient debate is whether it is constitutionally permissible to forcibly medicate insane prison-
ers in order to execute them. See generally ABA Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, Rec-
ommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 668 (2006); Cf. Douglas Mossman, The Psychiatrist and Execution Competency: Fording 
Murky Ethical Waters, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1992); see generally Brian D. Shannon & Victor R. Scarano, 
Incompetency to Be Executed: Continuing Ethical Challenges & Time for A Change in Texas, 45 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 419, 451 (2013); see also Lyn Suzanne Entzeroth, The Illusion of Sanity: The Constitutional and Moral 
Danger of Medicating Condemned Prisoners in Order to Execute Them, 76 TENN. L. REV. 641, 641-42 (2009) 
(“Given the growing number of mentally ill prisoners on death row and the advances of antipsychotic medica-
tions, the Supreme Court will likely face questions of whether a medicated, mentally ill prisoner can be executed 
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after his revelation God provided him a clean slate, and therefore his execution was not 
motivated by retribution for killing his in-laws, but rather by demonic suppression.207 The 
court erred by focusing on Panetti’s statement that his execution was unjust without regard 
to the indisputable evidence that indicated otherwise.208 
In substituting its unscientific and subjective conclusions for expert opinions, the 
court did not consider that Panetti’s statement was simply a regurgitation of what he heard 
while litigating his case.209 Panetti’s statement demonstrated that he was factually aware 
of the reasons for his punishment, but did not reveal that he rationally understood it.210 In 
essence, the court coalesced awareness with understanding.211 As explained by NAMI,  
“the distinction between ‘awareness’ and ‘understanding’ drawn in Panetti does little good 
if state courts continue to conflate the two and if they rely instead on an intuitive, unsci-
entific conception of mental illness.”212 The Supreme Court carefully distinguished 
“awareness” and “understanding” in Panetti.213 Conflating the two terms, as the district 
court did, does not ensure that the offender recognizes the severity of his crime, and thus, 
does not achieve the retributive purpose that the Eight Amendment requires.214 
D.  The Fifth Circuit’s Flaws in Panetti’s Subsequent Habeas Proceeding 
In August 2013, the Fifth Circuit once again reviewed the district court’s determi-
nation that Panetti was competent for execution.215 “Satisfied that the district court applied 
the correct standard,” the Fifth Circuit addressed “whether the district court’s ultimate 
findings of competency [was] clearly erroneous in light of the evidence adduced at Pan-
etti’s competency hearing.”216 Ultimately, it affirmed, concluding that Panetti was compe-
tent for execution for two reasons.217 First, there was conflicting expert testimony.218 Sec-
ond, the recordings of Panetti’s conversations with his parents corroborated the State’s 
experts.219 
1. Conflicting Expert Testimony 
The court explained that the conflicting expert testimony was sufficient on its own 
to sustain the district court’s conclusion.220 It stated that Dr. Waldman, the State’s chief 
                                                          
and whether a state can force a prisoner to take antipsychotic medication in preparation for execution.”). 
 207. The Evaluation of Scott Louis Panetti of Alan J. Waldman, M.D., supra note 144. For instance, when Dr. 
Waldman asked Panetti “Don’t you think that any of this has something to do with murdering your in-laws,” he 
responds “All my guilt has been washed away. When a man is in Christ he is a new creation. I pray that you have 
been given in to Christ.” Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. NAMI, supra note 189, at 13. 
 210. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 955-56 (2007); Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 
WL 2338498, at *36 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008). 
 211. NAMI, supra note 189, at 13. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 956. 
 214. Id. at 956; NAMI, supra note 189, at 13. 
 215. Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398, 410 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id.  
 220. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 410-11. 
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expert, concluded that Panetti suffered from no mental illness whatsoever, and thus ration-
ally understood the retributive connection between his crimes and the punishment.221 Not-
withstanding the Supreme Court’s instructions to utilize the expertise of psychiatric sci-
ence in competency for execution hearings, the Fifth Circuit only effectively considered 
the testimony of one expert.222 That expert was the only expert to claim that Panetti had a 
rational understanding of the retributivist value of his execution.223 Dr. Waldman’s con-
clusion that Panetti was not mentally ill conflicted with the Supreme Court and years of 
psychiatric history, yet the Fifth Circuit ultimately embraced Dr. Waldman’s opinions.224 
Conversely, as recognized by the Fifth Circuit, multiple experts concluded that Pan-
etti genuinely experienced delusions that prevented him from grasping the retributivist 
nature of his punishment.225 The court added “that Panetti no longer clearly expressed” the 
delusion that his execution was part of a satanic conspiracy to keep him from preaching 
when interviewed in December 2007.226 In making this statement, the Fifth Circuit, like 
the district court, minimized evidence of Panetti’s mental illness.227  Dr. Conroy’s state-
ment regarding differences in Panetti’s delusions from her subsequent interview with him 
reflected that he was more direct about his delusions in 2004, but in the later interview he 
continued to believe his execution to be part of a demonic conspiracy.228 Nonetheless, the 
court determined that one expert disagreeing with multiple experts regarding Panetti’s 
competency constituted conflicting expert testimony to which the court must give “great 
deference”; thereby affirming the district court’s dependence on Dr. Waldman’s testi-
mony.229 
2. Recordings Corroborated Expert Testimony 
The Fifth Circuit’s second reason for affirming the district court’s finding of com-
petency was that the recordings corroborated the expert testimony.230 The court found that 
the recordings revealed that Panetti had a “remarkably sophisticated understanding of his 
capital case,” which indicated he was malingering; that he had the capacity to rationally 
understand his situation, as demonstrated by his ability to talk about the death penalty in 
an abstract way; and, most notably, that he attributed his conviction to political, not spir-
itual corruption.231 The court opined that Panetti demonstrated a sophisticated understand-
ing, as evinced by his statements about a character witness, his recognition that the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in a lethal injection case, and his prediction that the 
Supreme Court would again grant certiorari in his case.232 For the court, this demonstrated 
                                                          
 221. Id.  
 222. Id.  
 223. Id.  
 224. Id.; Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *25 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008). 
 225. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *22. Dr. Conroy explained “that due to Panetti’s ‘severe psychotic condi-
tion, he lacks the ability to rationally understand the reasons for his current situation. . . . [believing] that he is on 
a mission from God and that evil forces are pursuing his death in order to silence him.’” Id.  
 229. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411. 
 230. Id. at 410-11. 
 231. Id. at 411-12. 
 232. Id. 
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that he was malingering, which implied that Panetti’s cognitive functioning was incon-
sistent with schizophrenia.233 Moreover, the court’s logic suggested that a prisoner is in-
competent for execution only if mental illness cripples reality such that he or she lacks 
awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case; but, that is not the Panetti 
standard.234 
Additionally, the court found that the recordings revealed Panetti’s capacity to ra-
tionally understand his situation, because he discussed the death penalty’s “moral and po-
litical implications.”235 However, in Panetti, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the 
competency for execution standard does not turn upon a prisoner’s mental capacity.236 
Resultantly, the Fifth Circuit’s assertion that Panetti’s statements about the death penalty 
demonstrated that he was “capable of understanding the retributive connection between 
his crime and his punishment,” was largely unhelpful to the Panetti analysis.237 Even if the 
court was not referring to Panetti’s capacity when it stated that Panetti was capable of 
understanding, the court’s examples do not demonstrate that Panetti rationally understood 
that his execution was a result of killing his in-laws.238 The court’s examples include the 
following: 
 
On December 4, 2007, Panetti observe[d] that “in the Old Testament 
God says the greatest part of justice is mercy. And in the Old Testament 
when it comes to the death penalty, you—you gotta have two or more 
eyewitnesses. This is in the Old Testament law, and there were many 
cities in refuge. Where if there’s any question of someone accidentally 
or unknowing [sic] kills somebody, they can go to that city of refuge.” 
On the same date, Panetti reflecte[d] on the likelihood that the 2008 elec-
tion may lead to changes in capital punishment, observing that “it de-
pends on whoever gets the nomination,” that “from what I heard on the 
news today, Hillary’s for the death penalty,” and that “[indecipherable] 
percentage is against the death penalty.” When Panetti’s mother sug-
geste[d] that Hillary “works for the Jewish people in her state” and that 
Jewish people “believe eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth,” Panetti disa-
gree[d], urging that “[m]ost all Jewish people, because of the Holocaust, 
are very much against the death penalty.”239 
 
These statements indicate at most that Panetti could discuss the death penalty in the ab-
stract, as they did not concern the reasons for his execution; however a schizophrenic’s 
delusions are personalized.240 While his statements concerned the death penalty, none per-
tained to Panetti’s spiritual or moral responsibility for his crimes, and none contradicted 
                                                          
 233. Id. 
 234. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411-12. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id.; Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *26 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008). 
 237. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411-12; Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *26. 
 238. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411-12. 
 239. Id. at 412; Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *26. 
 240. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 955 (2007). 
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Panetti’s fixed belief that evil forces were responsible for his execution.241 
Finally, the court explained that the most damning evidence for Panetti was his at-
tribution of his conviction to political corruption, instead of spiritual corruption.242 The 
court further stated, “[n]ot once [in the recordings, did] Panetti indicate that the State 
[sought] his execution to prevent him from ‘preaching the Gospel,’ as his delusions alleg-
edly cause[d] him to believe.”243 However, the court ignored that Panetti referred to the 
trial judge as a “devil worshipper” in the recordings.244 Panetti spoke of political corruption 
but the recordings contained evidence of Panetti’s delusions, as well.245 The court’s state-
ment that Panetti rationally understood that his execution was a consequence of his crime, 
merely because he stated, “Fredericksburg had to have a hanging,” bore the most con-
cern.246 Viewing this statement in context, it demonstrated that Panetti believed that a de-
monic conspiracy unjustly sought his execution.247 
3. Summarizing the Fifth Circuit’s Failings 
Essentially, in giving great deference to the district court, the Fifth Circuit found that 
Panetti was competent to face execution, disregarding much evidence that warranted an 
opposite result.248 Not only did the court ignore evidence of Panetti’s severe mental illness, 
it contradicted psychiatric science by equating Panetti’s cognitive functioning with his ra-
tional functioning.249 Given the importance of the issue determined in this case—whether 
the State could take Scott Panetti’s life—the Fifth Circuit should have more thoughtfully 
considered the evidence before it.250 The Fifth Circuit’s message is clear.251 That is, in any 
case where a district court parrots the correct standard, it need not meaningfully apply that 
standard so long as there is a shred of conflicting expert evidence, even when a man’s life 
is at stake.252 At least that was the result for Scott Panetti.253  
IV.  ISSUES HIGHLIGHTED BY PANETTI’S SUBSEQUENT HABEAS PROCEEDINGS 
Though Panetti established a substantive test for competency, Panetti II highlighted 
significant challenges for the severely mentally ill on death row.254 First, Panetti II illus-
trated the courts’ misconceptions of mental illness.255 Second, those misconceptions 
demonstrated a need for psychological science to aid the courts in distinguishing aware-
ness from understanding.256 Third, Panetti II signaled a need for an evidentiary standard 
                                                          
 241. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411-12; Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *26. 
 242. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411-12. 
 243. Id. at 412. 
 244. Oral Argument, supra note 199, at 51:06. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 412 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 410. 
 249. Id. at 411-12. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411-12. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 410. 
 254. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 398; Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498 (S.D. Tex. 
Mar. 26, 2008). 
 255. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *24-26, *28-29, *36. 
 256. Id. 
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to ensure meaningful consideration of the all of the evidence in competency for execution 
hearings.257 Finally, Panetti II indicated a great disadvantage for the indigent mentally ill 
prisoner.258 
A.  Understanding Cognitive Functioning Verses Rational Thinking 
Panetti II highlights the criminal justice system’s failure to recognize that those who 
suffer from mental illness do not necessarily have deficient cognitive functioning.259 Men-
tal illness is not the same as mental retardation.260 Mental health professionals understand 
that individuals who suffer from psychotic disorders do not necessarily suffer other types 
of impairments, allowing a severely ill individual to appear greatly intelligent.261 John 
Forbes Nash’s story illustrates this point.262 Nash won the Nobel Prize for his contributions 
to game theory, while believing that aliens from outer space recruited him to save the 
world.263 He later stated, “the ideas I had about supernatural beings came to me the same 
way that my mathematical ideas did.”264 In this same way, Panetti’s ability to sophisticat-
edly understand his case and his cognizance of the adversarial nature of the justice system 
did not demonstrate his rational understanding of his punishment.265 
   
B.      Distinguishing Awareness and Understanding 
 
       In addition, the courts’ misconceptions regarding mental illness reflected the im-
portance of professional guidance in competency hearings to distinguish awareness from 
understanding.266 Though the holding in Panetti theoretically championed a stringent com-
petency standard, the lower courts conflation of understanding and awareness largely strip 
Panetti of any protective effect.267  Conflation occurs when a court, as did the courts in 
Panetti II, infers that a prisoner rationally understands the reason for the punishment 
merely because he or she can recite those reasons.268 Such inferences do not ensure that a 
prisoner rationally understands the retributivist thrust of his or her punishment.269 The Pan-
etti II courts recognized the distinction by modeling the correct standard, yet confused 
awareness with understanding by assuming that Panetti rationally understood the reason 
for his punishment once they decided that Panetti was aware of his case and the adversarial 
                                                          
 257. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411. 
 258. Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2-3, Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2013); Panetti v. 
Thaler, 727 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2013).  
 259. Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *24-26, *28-29, *36. 
 260. NAMI, supra note 189, at 5-6. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. (citing E.F. TORREY, SURVIVING SCHIZOPHRENIA: A MANUAL FOR FAMILIES, PATIENTS, AND 
PROVIDERS 25-26 (5th ed. 2006)). 
 264. Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 265. NAMI supra note 189, at 5-6 (citing E.F. TORREY, SURVIVING SCHIZOPHRENIA: A MANUAL FOR 
FAMILIES, PATIENTS, AND PROVIDERS 25-26 (5th ed. 2006)). 
 266. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 955 (2007); Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 
WL 2338498, at *24-26, *28-29, *36 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008); NAMI, supra note 189, at 5-6. 
 267. NAMI, supra note 189, at 5-6. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
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process.270 
Distinguishing understanding from awareness is difficult; and thus courts should 
base their competency findings on probing questions by qualified experts in structured 
competency examinations, instead of “attempting to isolate remarks evincing an inmate’s 
cognitive awareness from a pervasive and deeply-embedded delusional belief system,” as 
the courts did in Panetti II.271 
 C.  Shifting the Second Burden of Proof to the State 
  
Panetti II also indicated that Panetti’s stringent standard meant nothing in the ab-
sence of an appropriately placed evidentiary burden.272 As in demonstrated by Panetti II, 
allocating the burden of proof to the prisoner can be dispositive of the outcome in compe-
tency for execution hearings.273 Panetti bore the initial burden of making a substantial 
showing of insanity and the subsequent burden of proving his incompetency by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.274 On remand, the courts determined that Panetti failed to meet 
his burden despite their recognition that Panetti was seriously mentally ill because the rec-
ord contained conflicting expert testimony.275 In most cases, though, conflicting expert 
testimony is commonplace, thereby restricting the likelihood that courts will find insane 
prisoners competent for execution; and thus in “cases where evidence is conflicting and 
experts for the parties disagree on the defendant’s level of competence, maintaining the 
double burden created by the Panetti II court[s] will result in repeated Eighth Amendment 
violations.”276  
Additionally, as recognized by the Supreme Court, when a person’s life is at stake, 
“the risk of error that the law can tolerate is correspondingly diminished.”277 Similarly, in 
Ford, the Court eloquently stated, “the ascertainment of a prisoner’s sanity as a predicate 
to lawful execution calls for no less stringent standards than those demanded in any other 
aspect of a capital proceedings’ due to the ‘high regard for truth that befits a decision 
affecting the life or death of a human being.”278 Placing a double burden on a prisoner to 
demonstrate incompetency is not only unsupported by case law but is repugnant to it and 
the common understanding of justice.279 For Scott Panetti the double burden was fatal.280 
D.  Recognizing the Detriment of Indigence on the Severely Mentally Ill Prisoner  
                                                          
 270. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 555; Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *24-26, *28-29, *36; NAMI, supra note 189, at 
5-6. 
 271. Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 258, at 15, 24. 
 272. Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398, 411 (5th Cir. 2013); Greenberg, supra note 11, at 255.  
 273. Greenberg, supra note 11, at 255. 
 274. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 411. 
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 276. Danielle N. Devens, Competency for Execution in the Wake of Panetti: Shifting the Burden to the Gov-
ernment, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1335, 1365-66 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 277. Id. (citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 362 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 278. Id. (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411-12 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 279. Id.  
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Finally, Panetti II demonstrated the insurmountable disparity between the indigent 
mentally ill prisoner and the State.281 The district court provided Panetti $5,000 for experts, 
while the State paid Dr. Waldman alone more than $22,000.282 As a result, the State de-
posed all of the defense experts, and paid Dr. Waldman to attend two defense expert dep-
ositions and inspect the defense experts’ documents.283 At trial, the State experts remained 
in the courtroom throughout the hearing and assisted State counsel during cross-examina-
tion of defense witnesses.284 Panetti’s funds restricted his experts to provide approximately 
ten hours of assistance each, primarily exhausted by review of Panetti’s thirty-year psy-
chiatric history and interviewing him.285 Most damning to Panetti, though, was the State’s 
ability to pay its experts to analyze the recorded conversations between Panetti and his 
family.286 Those recordings weighed heavily in the courts’ finding that Panetti rationally 
understood his punishment, yet Panetti had no opportunity to challenge the significant of 
the recordings.287 
V. CONCLUSION 
Panetti II signified a long road ahead for the severely mentally ill on death row.288 
More than twenty years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Ford, which established a 
categorical death penalty exemption for the insane, the Court provided a substantive test 
in Panetti to ensure that an insane prisoner awaiting death rationally understands the re-
tributive thrust of his or her punishment, which the Eighth Amendment requires.289 Though 
Panetti theoretically championed a protective competency standard, the rational under-
standing standard had no protective effect as applied by the district court and the Fifth 
Circuit.290 In essence, the district court and Fifth Circuit’s application of the rational un-
derstanding standard was reprehensively deficient, because they trivialized and ignored 
symptoms of Panetti’s genuine and severe psychiatric disorder.291 The courts relied on a 
                                                          
 281. Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 259. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id.  
 287. Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398, 410 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 288. Id.; Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2008). The 
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Indiana modeled the correct standard, but misapplied it, concluding that a prisoner was competent because no 
evidence indicated that he questioned the reality that his execution was punishment for his crime, though he 
believed that devils and demons were responsible for the crime. Id. 
 289. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986), Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958 (2007). 
 290. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958; Panetti, 727 F.3d 298; Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498. 
 291. Panetti, 727 F.3d at 414; Panetti, 2008 WL 2338498, at *37. 
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single expert’s testimony, which contradicted years of psychiatric diagnoses.292 Conse-
quently, the courts found support for that expert’s opinion by extracting and isolating a 
few of Panetti’s statements, basing their ultimate findings of Panetti’s competence on un-
scientific misapprehensions of mental illness.293 
Though the Supreme Court recognized value in the aid of psychological science in 
competency hearings, the courts’ errors demonstrated the imperativeness of well-qualified 
experts to distinguish a prisoner’s awareness from his or her understanding.294 Addition-
ally, competency hearings commonly include conflicting expert testimony due to the com-
plexities of mental illness. Thus placing a double evidentiary burden on the prisoner di-
minishes the protective effect of the Panetti standard.295 Finally, Panetti II illustrated the 
fatal effects of indigence on the mentally ill death row inmate, as Panetti’s indigence pre-
vented him from hiring an expert to assess his recorded statements on which the courts 
heavily relied.296 
On January 27, 2014, Panetti filed a new petition for writ of certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court. Though the Court may ultimately deny certiorari, the district court 
and Fifth Circuit’s failings demonstrate the need for further clarification to insulate the 
severely ill on death row from executions.297 The deficient record in Panetti prevented the 
Court from providing more definitive guidelines for competency determinations, thus, one 
task for the district court on remand was to develop a more complete record.298 Having 
now a more thorough record than in 2007, the Court may take Panetti II as an opportunity 
to provide additional guidelines to prevent courts from removing the protective effect of 
the rational understanding standard, as states continue to execute insane prisoners.299 The 
Court should grant certiorari and recognize that for Panetti to have any significance courts 
must resist basing competency decisions on unscientific misapprehensions of mental ill-
ness and instead meaningfully consider the conclusions of qualified mental health profes-
sionals.300 The Court’s failure to do so will allow the State of Texas to execute Scott Louis 
Panetti without indication that his execution serves any retributive or consequential aim 
that the Eighth Amendment requires.301  
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